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1. Introduction 
Decentralization  through reduction of the state property share aimed at attracting loan and 
joint stock capital, including foreign capital, in the conditions of continual acute shortage of 
primary energy sources such as coal, gas and petroleum  as well as lack of investment for 
modernization could be termed as ‘partial deregulation’ [Nedin & Oricha 1998]. The 
transition from vertical integrated utility to unbundle utilities made inevitable a number of 
basic rearrangements of the power industry management both in developed and developing 
countries.  
The practical implementation of restructuring the branch was reflected in energy market 
creation and partial denationalization of the power industries of different types [Oricha, 
1998}. Restructuring was aimed at a number of goals which were unattainable in the 
conditions of the former organizational  management structure. The main goals of the 
restructuring were to create the competitive environment (first of all in the field of energy 
production transmission and distribution), as well as to attract foreign investing capital (IC), 
that will be needed for the large-scale modernization of the fixed capital stock (FCS). The 
development of competition was substantiated by the opportunity to raise the effectiveness 
of power production, reduce costs of production and improve reliability of power supply. 
Unfortunately the above mentioned goals are always unattainable in partial deregulation 
and could even lead to management crisis with some negative consequences.  The main risk 
in deregulation of energy sector is the risk of unfavourable regulatory decisions and cost 
overruns due to bad project management [Nedin & Oricha]. It is clear that the best approach 
toward energy cost reduction is investment and technological modernization. However, 
introduction of liberalisation in energy markets is removing the regulatory risk shield and 
thereby exposing investors to various business risks. The level of risk anticipated by an 
investor in a power plant will be reflected in the level of return expected on that investment 
[ Daniel S.K & Garan .S, 2004]. This means the greater the business and financial risk, the 
higher the return that would be demanded. The management crisis  that would eventually 
occurs and will also affect the volume of investments in liberalized markets is the inherent 
uncertainty about electricity prices in electricity markets. This chapter discusses this 
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management crisis and some of its negative consequences and give suggestions on how to 
modelling the organizational management structure in power industries. 
2. Management crisis and its consequences in deregulation of energy sector 
in Ukraine 
During the transition and breakdown of Soviet Union, Ukrainian energy sector was 
subjected to deep economic crisis that calls for immediate restructuring and re-organization 
of various forms of ownership. The failure to achieve the main goals of restructuring the 
energy sector leads to management crisis in power industry with some negative 
consequences. One of the first steps in restructuring energy sector in Ukraine by then was to 
amend some of the normative acts inherited from the monopolistic forms of management. 
However, decentralization of the state property share to attract loans including foreign 
investments, created a further management crises in the power industry of Ukraine. The 
development of competition by creating energy market to raise the effectiveness of power 
production, reduce expenses and prevent increase in the energy products also were not 
achieved but resulted in further increase in the prices of energy products.  
The three major problems identified as the main reason for restructuring are: 
• The basic production assets - fixed capital stock (FCS) were won out and the low 
efficiency of their uses  
• Serious acute shortage of primary energy sources; 
• Low caloric nature of the imported fuels.    
These three problems mentioned above refer in particular to the coal thermal power plants, 
which constitute the basis of the Ukrainian power industry. Thus, 48 % of the thermal power 
plants generating units have passed their utilization threshold and at least $30 million and 
extensive time period is needed for their modernization that would meet the up-to-date 
safety, economic and ecological requirements. On the other hand, 200 and 300 MW coal 
generating units are compelled to be used to cover the alternating part of the load schedule 
because of insufficient maneuver capability in the Ukrainian energy system. It resulted in 
increased fuel consumption, 30-45 % increase in internal energy consumption, decrease in 
efficiency factor and increase in fuel unit cost, rising wear level and reduced generating 
equipment reliability [.Nedin , Ryzhov., Oricha & Chastockolenko, 2001].   
The above stated conditions caused constant increase of energy production costs that are not 
paid off by means of present day rates, which consequently undermines the financial state 
of the power enterprises. However restructuring held in the conditions of continual acute 
economic crisis not only failed to eliminate the destabilizing factors, mentioned above, but 
provoked in addition a number of negative consequences, including: 
1. Application of foreign loans; 
Investing loans of the international financial companies proved insufficient for visible 
improvement of the technical and economic indicators of the power industry, and their use 
proved irrational [ Nedin, Senko & Shetrenko, 1999]. During the energy crisis in Ukraine, 
the World Bank provided credits to Ukrainian ministry of energy for thermal power station 
modernization, which has appeared too minor to improve the economic situation of the 
power sector in appreciable measure. 
Loan repayment and the payment for the expenses on their services according to the lending 
terms must be made by means of surcharges to the corresponding rates. It overlaps with the 
general decrease in domestic manufacturing and paying capability of the energy consumers, 
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posing the threat of increasing loan debt and further destabilisation of the  the financial 
status of power industry.   
2. Privatization through the sales of public utilities assets; 
Attracting the investment capital (IC) through  sales of the ‘public power utilities’  share 
holdings without clear regulated and controlled liabilitites of the new share holders that 
cannot guarantee the necessary fixed capital stock (FCS) modernization  will leads to  loss of 
state control over the most important basic economy branch. The loss of state control over 
power sector  will results to catastophic economic consequences that affects other branch of 
the economy as a whole. From the experience of restructuring  energy sectors in various 
places such as Chile, Carifonia, Russia and etc. became clear that fairely aged power 
equipment/infrastructures are not attractive to investors.  Thefore, the orientation to sell 
some of the state share holdings   to attract investors always deepen the management and 
economic crisis of the power industry. 
3. Introduction of independent power suppliers (IPS) and Introduction of independent 
power producers (IPP); 
Involving many independent power suppliers (IPS) to discourage monopoly and creating a 
competitive environment for electricity market failed due to problem of lack of payments.  
In addition to problem of lack of funds, majority of IPS has no direct relation to power 
production and IPS according to different estimates 60-80% control  the entire sales volume 
profits. And this means that the power industry is losing a lot of funds , which could have 
been  partially used for further investments. The involement of many independent power 
supliers only added to the burden the consumers bear because the cost of power can only be 
reduced if there are enough power producers who have no mopolistic power over the price 
but compete on the basis of price bids and offers.  In a competetive electricity market where 
the producers have no control over the price but want to maximize their profits, will be 
compel to use those generating units where the production costs will be minimized or  use 
more efficient equipment. In partial deregulation, this could not be achieved because 
majority of the investors will always  feel reluctanct to invest in a sector where prices cannot 
be forecasted as a result of regulatory action that maybe imposed.  In practice, deciding to 
invest in a new generating plant is considerably more complex because of considerable 
amount of uncertainty. Construction delays and fluctation in the price of fuel can affect the 
long-run marginal cost. On the other hand, acording to [Fraser &  Huist, 2003], the evolution 
of wholesale electricity prices over a long period is a nototoriously difficult to forecast 
because demand might change, competitors might enter the market or new, more efficient 
generation technologies might be developed. Once the problems mentioned above cannot be 
predicted and solved, then partial deregulation will always lead to management crisis with 
catastrphic economics problem of the state. 
The idea of allowing IPP to take active part in power generation is to create an environment 
conducive for electricity markets to exit, with the view that when we have more power 
producers, there is likely possibilities that there would be surplus in power generation 
thereby reduces the prices. But unfortunately, competition in partial deregulation is 
normally limited primarily to the power realization field. This will lead to practically no 
effective competition that could stimulate tangible decrease in power and heat production 
costs.  This doesn’t let stabilize consumers’ paying capacities and together with too widely 
spread and insufficiently grounded use of noncash forms of payment (promissory notes and 
mutual offset) that cannot create the environment for financial / capital accumulation.  
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4. Absense of perfect regulatory and legal framework; 
Absense of perfect regulatory and legal framework, which could regulate the interaction of 
market participants of different forms of ownership in all the power industry fields, is 
aggravated by no pracctical actions taken to organize mutually beneficial cooperation of the 
public power sector (PPS) companies with private corporations and enterprises aiming at 
participating in energy production and investing into it. This essentially restricts the 
opportunities of private power companies potential use, that could improve the technical 
and economic indicators of the industry in general. For instance, one of the major problems 
in deregulation of energy sector in Nigeria is lack of perfect regulatory and legal framework 
that is discouraging independent power producers (IPP) to participate in the field of 
electricity generation. It is observed that the largest potential resource for power generation 
in Nigeria is natural gas, which current estimate of total about 187 trillion cubic feet [The 
Nigerain Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2008]. Technically speaking, even 10% of this 
natural gas reserves can support over 10,000 MW capacity power plants operating at a 
power factor of 80% for 22,000 years. However, the total power generation in Nigeria as of 
2010 is not up to 4,000 MW, while the minimum total demand was estimated to be 10,000 
MW for fairly constant power supply. It was estimated that the total available coal deposit 
can support 15,700 MW capacity at 80% capacity utilization for over 50 years but the 
challenges facing coal power generation in Nigeria include uncertainities in the actual 
reserves of coal on which long term projects could be based, low productivity of the coal 
mines, low level of mechanization of production facilities and absence of cost- effective 
transportation system and lack of investment in coal industry. 
The major problems as always explained  by Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) 
was shortage  of gases  to power the plants. The reallity of the problem is that over the past 
50 years of oil and gas production in Nigeria, the greater part of the gas produced had been 
flared while investment in the usable gas supply had focused more on exports than on 
domestic utilization. In this situation, oil and gas  in Nigeria still remained vertically 
intergated while   privatization  to bring competition  was introduced in power  sector. But 
Unfortunately, privatization is not a prequisite for the introduction of competition [Daniel & 
Garan, 2004]. The Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission introduced various codes 
that further complicated the right of independent power producers and consumers with 
additional increase in the cost of power production. The amount of charges that an IPP will 
have to pay inorder to allowed to be connect to National gride are so much that practically 
no IPP will have a strong incentive to participate in power generation.  
The major negative consequences in restructuring the energy secor in Nigeria is continous 
high prices of goods and sercices as a result of high cost of electricity genaration. 
The experience in South Australia suggests that markets can respond to price signal and 
meet demand and reliability requirements  if government policies are consistent with the 
development of effcient and sustainable electricity markets, and where they are 
implemented transparently and consistently [Fraser & Huist, 2003]. However, in the 
examples of restructuring of Ukrainian, Nigerian  energy sectors  as cited above does not 
have a conssitent and transparent policies that would attract investments for modernization 
of the basic production assets. These factors mantioned above are the basis for management 
crisis phenomena in partial deregulation of energy sector. 
5. Establishment of power markets; 
Power market establishment with non-existent coal and gas market, nonequivalent 
exchange of coal for power regulated by subjective negotiated prices deepens the coal and 
gas  industry crisis and endangers the next shortage of coal and gas  output.  
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The above listed factors are particularly dangerous not only for the power industry, but also 
for related industries, bacause the stable escalation loop of the crisis phenomena (its 
fragment shown in the figure below) has been formed. In the given loop investment capital  
(IC) and current capital deficit stimulates further fixed capital stock (FCS) wear escalation  
and worsening of their technical and economic indicators.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Degradation factors interplay in the crisis phenomena escalation loop 
3. Escalation loop of the crisis phenomena as a result of partial deregulation 
of energy sector 
The figure above illustrate the escalation of the crisis phenomena that normally exists as a 
result of partial deregulation of energy sector. The direction of the arrows indicate how one 
action or consequence will stimulate the others to happen. In this case there will be 
continious crisis phenomena in form of loop. Consequently, competitive ability of the power 
systems in the market economy deteriorates, the danger of big breakdowns  and actual 
breakdown rate increase, which respectively provokes increased spendings on the repair 
works and, accordingly, prevents the use of resources in other fields of their proper use. 
In this situation there would be always budget deficit. As a result, the incresed demand for 
loans and no real prospect to promptly repay them and pay for their servicing, are 
stimulated.  And this means that the further stimulation of such threats to security of energy 
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supply (ENS) as “investment stock deficit and its inefficient application”, “financial 
destabilization and non-payment increase”, “violation of import equipment, materials and 
fuel deliveries” etc. 
The above noted phenomena in power industry alone due to increased power selliing price 
and respectively rate increase influence in an extremely negative way the competitive ability 
of the national economy on the whole, which according to [Nedin., Senko, Shetrenko, 1999] 
is defined as «the position of the country or the commodity producer at the domestic and 
foreign markets” (ability to withstand the international competition at these markets). And 
it is caused by the energy production price rise, what should be considered as reduced 
competitiveness of energy as a commodity, which seriously complicates realization 
opportunities of the reproductive processes not only in power industry, but also in other 
industries. And renewable resources are generally known to be one of the main 
preconditions to the economic security (ECS) of the state. 
The only way to change the established situation is to create preconditions to activate all 
available investment capital (IC) [6] in order to reach the FCS state when the energy 
production costs could decrease to the level enough to stabilize consumers’ paying ability 
and power enterprises financial condition. The opportunities of the power companies, 
belonging to the PPS of Ukraine, are absolutely restricted. That is why the following 
directions should be considered as priority to meet the present-day management crisis in 
power industry: 
i. The use of more rational (compared to the ones suggested by the World’s Bank) 
schemes to organize investing in power projects, that provide the possibility for prompt 
loan debt repayment introducing no surcharges to rates and the energy selling price.  
ii. Creating the real competitive environment in the power production field, taking into 
account existing energy market regulations. Hereby the mutually beneficial cooperation 
of the market participants of different forms of ownership that would enjoy equal rights 
should be guaranteed, which may further call for specification and improvement of the 
regulatory and legal framework of their interaction.  
iii. Provision of economic and organizational conditions to ensure the high-quality fuel 
supply to the dust-coal thermal power plants, including the formation of regional 
multifunctional industrial and financial groups encompassing general purpose thermal 
power plants, mines, coal cleaning, metallurgical and other power-consuming 
enterprises.  
Concerning the first direction financial leasing should be noted as the most reasonable 
investment form applicable to the energy projects in Ukraine; it can be combined with the 
“tax holidays” regime [Nedin & Oricha, 1998] and applied to the objects, created by means 
of effective loan irrespective of its receiver’s form of ownership. At the same time the “tax 
holidays” should be considerd not only the form of tax benefits, but first of all the form of 
establishing the conditions for tax base extended recreation and growth on the basis of 
production development and efficiency increase beyond the “tax holidays” duration period.  
The second direction suggests that the PPS cooperate in the power production field with 
private companies,  focused to create their own generating capactites on the basis of the 
most efficient power production technologies use. JSC “Kontsern Energiya / Concern 
Energy” [Nedin , Oricha & Sheverev, 1999] is one of such companies; it developed the 
project of use of the combined-cycle plant run on the natural gas, having high efficiency 
coefficient, not less than 52-55 %.  Under current economic conditions such cooperation will 
let the PPS to expand its structure and the range of sources of income as well as promote 
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competitive ability of the coal thermal power plants. Here are the major advantages of the 
cooperation worth mentioning [Nedin I.V., Senko I.V., Shetrenko,1999]: 
1. Payment for the specialized construction and mounting organizations of the industry 
for their participation in bulding the private power objects. According to [Oricha., 
Nedin .1998], approximately $9, 77 billion is expected to be assigned for investing in  
the power objects taking into account 15 year period of reinvestment. If at least 20% of 
the sum is used to pay for the services of the organizations, then they will be able to 
annually receive approximately $130 million as direct payments as opposed to loans.   
And the loan liabilities lie with their receiver, not the PPS.  At the same time, the sum 
given substantially exceeds the average annual amount assignable to the industry by 
international financial organizations. 
2. Payment for the traffic through 220-750 kW electrical networks and for the services of 
traffic control system, which objects are not subjected to denationalizing. If these 
services are used by a private power company to transfer 11,4 GW of the rated capacity 
through the energy system networks with the performance life equal to, for instance, 
5000 hours per year, then after all the pre-scheduled capacities have been put into 
operation  about 57 billion kW/h could be trafficked annually. If the traffic rate is 0, 17 
cent per kW/h the annual total will reach appr. $97 billion. These are also PPS direct 
payments and not loans. Certainly this sum will differ according to the year of the JSC 
“Concern Energy” program implementation, but even when 10 % of the capacities have 
been put into production this payment would be quite appreciable  given the present-
day financial state of the PPS. 
3. Decrease of the production cost of the power released across the energy system on the 
whole.  [9] illustrates that ,  with the 10 %  combined-cycle plant use share in the energy 
system capacities the decrease of the production cost of the power released could be 
compensated by the rate increase, that is inevitable compiling with the terms of the 
World’s Bank and the European bank for Reconstruction and Development debt loan 
repayment [Nedin I.V, Oricha J.Y, Sheverev, 1999]. In this case, notwithstanding the fact 
that according to the energy market regulations the specific weight of the power 
produced by the combined-cycle plants of the private energy company will surpass 
their value in the rated capacity of the energy system and the respective redistribution 
of the sold energy volume in favor of the private company, the production cost decrease 
will generally make it possible to avoid ungrounded increase of the corresponding 
rates. The latter should contribute to the renewal of consumer paying abilities and in 
the long run stabilize the payment regime.  
4. Stabilizing the energy system operating mode. A more stable operating mode will be 
ensured by the relatively maneuver combined-cycle plants, preplanned capacity of 
which significantly surpasses that of the existing thermal power plants, as a part of the 
rated capacity of the energy system. This will allow increasing the consumer power 
supply reliability, to reduce the costs for the repair of the coal thermal power plant 
heat-mechanic equipment, as well as to supplant a part of the thermal power plants 
from alternating component of the energy union load schedule. Owing to this the fuel 
consumption will be reduced as the result of lower number of starts and stops.  At the 
same time, in spite of the fact that the power delivery to such thermal power plants will 
fall, their profitability, as it has been illustrated in [Nedin, Ryzhov., Oricha, 
Chastockolenko, 2001] , can increase rather substantially, being the direct manifestation 
of their competitive ability. Due to combined-cycle plants more favorable conditions for 
www.intechopen.com
 
Energy Technology and Management  194 
the operation of power generating units equipped by the circulating boiling layer (CBL) 
boilers will be created, the capabilities of their use in the maneuver regime being still 
sufficiently studied. 
5. Possibility for PPS to take part in the public energy companies property.  Losses caused 
by the suppression of the PPS energy producers from the energy market can be partially 
compensated by the PPS participation as a shareholder-co-owner of the privately 
owned energy object, which will allow for certain redistribution of the revenues 
delivered by combined-cycle plants, that produces cheaper power as compared to the 
thermal power plants. But this being the case, PPS energy companies must bear a part 
of the responsibility, i.e. investment loan repayment. 
On the whole the result of such cooperation helps play for time and accumulate funds, 
sufficient for improving coal energy technologies.  
The third direction is effective in a way that it reduces the power production cost and the 
costs of end-produce of the consumer enterprises, belonging to a certain union. In this 
specific case, according to [Lir ., Nedin  Oricha & Xalyava], energy consumption in the coal 
output process is considered as the power spent for internal needs, i.e. power is supplied to 
the coal mining enterprises at its production cost price. As a result the production price of 
the heat and power end produce should be reduced.  At the same time the conditions for 
guaranteed higher quality fuel, delivered to the thermal power plants, are created. That is 
because its supplier operating in a united technological complex is interested in the end 
result - the decreased of the energy production cost, and therefore in the increase of its 
production efficiency.  The task of restricting the number of mediators, whose activities are 
based on fuel and energy resale, is simultaneously being radically solved.   There are other 
possible significant advantages of introducing a similar organization of multifunctional 
enterprises interaction — creation of favourable organizational and technological conditions 
for utilizing the ash-and-slad thermal power plants’ waste products and their relocation into 
the coal mine uses  etc.  
The above listed ways of improving the management organization have a significant 
influence on the production and technological sphere of power industry and must be 
implemented in compliance with economic and technical solutions, aimed at improving 
energy production efficiency. Complex realization of the listed directions is possible only 
with the necessary legislative support provided the latter being at the time insufficient to 
reach the target results. That is why the burning issue remains: to create the regulatory 
and legal framework, which can ensure mutually beneficial cooperation of market 
participants of different forms of ownership in energy production, with the obligatory 
condition to improve the main technical and economical indicators of power indutry 
(including the production cost of the released energy) and to keep their commercial 
interests balanced. 
4. Modeling the technical and economic results of organizational 
management strucure in power industry 
The introduction of market relations in power industry involves the necessary 
modernization of organizational and functional management structure (OFS) of the energy 
systems (ES) control. The necessity of such modernization is stipulated by changed terms of 
financing, decentralization of control functions, diversity of forms of ownership and other 
factors. The management OFS of the power facilities and their commercial interaction 
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influences ES reliability and security, and, consequently, power supply reliability. The 
structure of interaction of power facilities among themselves, with consumers of energy 
product, and with the systems ensuring ES operation, is rather complicated. That is why 
while choosing the OFS version one should not limit himself to intuitive understanding of 
their possible effectiveness. A meaningful quantitative estimate of the possible consequences 
of their application is indispensable. Below are some of the principal statements of such 
estimate.  
OFS is considered as a specific case of program-technical complex (PTC), meant to automate 
ES management, to ensure its reliable operation, etc. That is why to describe the versions of 
OFS the structural and contingency approach as applied to PTC, examined in [Nedin & 
Oricha 1998], is used, according to which technological and commercial interaction of the ES 
objects is reflected by a corresponding structural model, whose composition and internal 
structure are chosen as based on the level of territorial and operational hierarchy of the 
control object. The structural model gives account of material and cash flows with regard to 
their diversity. Material flows imply exchange of products – fuel, energy and various 
services, and cash flows imply co-payments, assignments to budgets of different levels, 
crediting, penalty charges, a.o. Material and cash flows can be of unilateral or two-way 
direction.  The choice of the OFS version should be determined only by assessment of 
consequences of their possible application.  
The evolution of technical and economic indicators which characterize the control object and 
results of its operation as well as characteristics of external environment, including the 
characteristics of regulatory and legal framework for the industrial and economic activities, 
is presented with the help of situational models, as it is shown in [Nedin , Oricha , 
Sheverev]. It should be taken into account that the composition and the nature of 
interconnection between the elements in the structural model in general case can change 
over time and thus is of situational nature.  
The Figure shows in less detail one of the possible types of power market participant 
interaction, which operates in the territory of a large energy union.. It also indicates the 
major material and cash flows and provides interpretation of the numerical symbols 
standing for the interacting power objects. The material and cash flows in the Figure 
designate the following:  
- ЭIII-I, ЭIV-I, ЭV-I – power production by PJGC, NPP and APU within the power 
union network; 
- ЭI-II – selling of power by energy union to power-suppliers;  
- VI, VII-I, VVI-0, VVI-I, VVI-II, VVI-III,VVI-IV – technical, resource, investment and 
financial, mediator, a.o. services; 
- OЭ0-III, OЭ0-IV, OЭ0-V, OЭII-0 – payment for power; 
- OУ0-III, OУ0-IV, OУ0-VI, OУII-VI, OУIII-VI, OУIV-VI – payment for technical, 
resource, investment and financial, mediator services. 
The first index in the designations of material and cash flows indicated above refers to the 
object, which markets power, renders services or makes payments, and the second index 
refers to the object-receiver. Below are the numerical designations of interacting power 
market participants:  
0 control center and its regional departments; 
I  high voltage 220-750 kW electrical network; 
II public joint-stock power supplying companies (PJSC); 
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III public joint-stock power generating companies (PJGC), which include thermal 
 power plants and hydropower plants; 
IV nuclear power plants;  
V  adjacent power unions (APU); 
VI  repair, transportation, investment and financial, mediator and other organizations 
 and enterprises, which render services to the power industry enterprises.  
 
 
  - power and services flows; 
  - flows of payment for power and services 
Fig. 2. Organizational and functional structure of commercial interaction between power 
markets Participants.       
Annual profit, calculated according to the formula given below, can be regarded as the 
measure of effectiveness of OFS commercial interaction with respect to individual power 
market participants: 
 ∏ 	଴ = ∑ ூܱூି଴௜  –ൣ ଴ܱିଵ௬ +	∑ ଴ܱିூ௏௬௝ +	∑ ଴ܱିூூூ௬௞ 	+ 	∑ ଴ܱିூ௏௬௦ +	∑ ଴ܱି௏௬௧ +	∋଴൧,   (1) 
 ∏ 	ଵ = ଴ܱିூ௬   - ൣ∑ ூܱି௏ூ௬ +	∋ூ௤ ൧,         (2) 
 ∏ 	ூூூ = ଴ܱିூூூ௬  - ൣ∑ ூܱூூି௏ூ௬௙ +	∋ூூூ൧ ,         (3) 
where 30, ЗI, Зш stand for total annual expenditure on principal industrial and economic 
activity; 1, j, k, s, t, q, f – indices, which testify multiplicity of possible ties between the 
subjects of commercial interaction.   
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For a higher level of hierarchy, e.g., for a regional level, to assess the effectiveness of a 
specific OFS version one can use such indicator as the sum of contribution to the budget 
made by power market participants.  
The scheme given in the Figure is used only to illustrate the principle of formalized 
description of commercial interaction applied to one out of many possible versions. OFS 
versions in specific calculations can be rather diverse and their variation consists in 
redistribution of different control functions among them, in changed quantitative 
characteristics of interaction, etc. The operational reliability of the mentioned objects is in 
direct relation to the extend to which earnings from payments cover the expenditures on 
maintenance and repair works (MARW) of the operational equipment, ensure the income 
accumulation in the amount sufficient for budget contributions, contributions to the 
centralized funds, whose availability of means can create a possibility to improve the fixed 
capital stock of the branch, etc. While making an estimate of the considered OFS version 
effectiveness it is necessary to take into account the conditions, provided in the table below. 
Factors 1.1-1.9 apply to all the relevant objects. Restrictions 2.1-2.3 apply to PJGC and the 
energy union integrally, while 2.4 is of a more general character. Restrictions 2.1 and 2.2 
determine the lower limit of the PJGC, NPP and high voltage electricity networks operating 
costs, and restrictions 2.3 and 2.4 – the upper limit of power sales proceeds and earnings 
from services rendered to customers. Efficiency factors can also be considered selectively 
depending on what objects the task is related to.  
The indicators from (1)-(3), whose interconnection is reflected in the above given structure 
of interaction, depend on work standards as well as on the numerical level of operating 
mode indicators of the energy union objects and the consumer power supply reliability. 
According to the new conditions of economic management, the above mentioned sources 
and components of payments are practically the only source of funds that ensure industrial 
and economic activities of the power enterprises.  
The process of formation of these means is extended in time.  The characteristics of this 
process depend on a specific content of the OFS modeled, whose structural functional and 
quantitative parameters are in a general case invariable over time. That is why an 
indispensible element of the complex of tools used for modeling technical and economic 
results of OFS implementation must be an appropriate system of situational models, with 
the help of which it is possible to track and predict the process of returns from the 
production consumed and services rendered, as well as the accompanying charges in the 
technical and economic indicators of the control object in a similar way to the one 
illustrated.. Such tracking makes it possible to get an idea of real possibilities of a specific 
OFS version within the time interval of a given period of T0 duration, within the range of 
which OFS application is planned. To make the situation estimates of the operating mode 
indicators of energy objects and their reliability, approved standard estimation software 
tools should be used, and subsequently situational estimate should be generalized for each 
of the analyzed versions. Meanwhile it must be taken into consideration that the structural 
model of OFS may be invariable within Tp, but situational nature of results of OFS 
application is still possible while there might be a change in macroeconomic conditions, 
technical state of the equipment in use and in other characteristics of the control object, 
which cause the change of its maintenance costs, of the size of payment components in  (1) – 
(3).  Generally, it should be noted that the OFS proper, meant to be used during a rather 
lengthy Tp, is more stable than the indicators estimating it and the organizational – 
economic and technical factors that influence them. 
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Conditions, 
restrictions 
and results 
Contents 
1. Accountable 
factors 
1.1. The structure of power objects interaction among themselves and 
with the external environment.  
1.2.The forms of ownership of the power complex objects 
1.3. Belonging to administrative and balance units.  
1.4. The level of centralization of control over interrelated power 
objects’ operating mode. 
1.5. The level of centralization of resources for MARW. 
1.6. The share of administrative expenses in the power object operating 
cost. 
1.7. Taxation and other contributions to budgets and centralized funds.  
1.8. Product and service sales proceeds. 
1.9. Production cost value. 
2. Accounted 
restrictions 
2.1. Fuel cost. 
2.2. The cost of spares, equipment and other services. 
2.3. Power release price. 
2.4. The cost of services rendered by power enterprises (reciprocal 
services and services rendered 
3. Possible 
economic 
results 
3.1. Economically sound level of centralization of control over the 
operation of power objects.   
3.2. Improvement of power supply reliability. 
3.3. Reduced operating time of power facilities.  
3.4. MARW resource shrinkage if they are ordered and stored centrally.  
3.5. Reduction of general expenses on supply of resources (spares, fuel, 
reduced number of personnel of different categories).  
3.6. Increase of power equipment serviceability by means of more 
effective use of technical diagnostic systems.  
3.7. Increased efficiency of settling with the consumers by means of 
applying respective technical systems calculating energy consumption, 
which are centrally controlled.  
3.8. Increased efficiency of power facility control by means of 
optimization of MARW Schedule diagram 
 
Table 1. Conditions of selection and possible results of realization of type of commercial 
interaction among energy complex. 
5. Conclusion 
In the process of preparing decision on adjusting the normative regulation of  industrial 
and economic activities and managerial decision to the new conditions of energy  system 
operation it is necessary to make a quantitative assessment  of the technical and economic 
results of applying the organizational and functional managerial structures that control 
www.intechopen.com
Management Crisis in Partial Deregulation of Energy Sector and  
Modeling the Technical and Economic Results of Organizational Management Structure 199 
the power objects and of their commercial interaction. Restructuring of energy sector and 
creation of competitive environment for smooth operation of the market participant 
interactions should be done in stages starting with the total deregulation of primary 
energy sources. The various factors that can affect the efficiency and   stability of power 
supply in developing countries according to [ Oricha, 2009], are  government policy, 
economy factor, society/community factor, natural phenomena factor, efficient 
technology and skilled personnel. These factors mentioned above should be taken into 
consideration when preparing for restructuring of  energy sector and privatization of 
public utilities. 
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